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Abstract
Reputation systems provide a valuable method to measure the trustworthiness of sellers or the quality
of products in an e-commerce environment. Due to their economic importance, reputation systems are
subject to many attacks. A common problem are unfair ratings which are used to unfairly increase or
decrease the reputation of an entity. Although being of high practical relevance, unfair rating attacks have
only rarely been considered in literature. The few approaches that have been proposed are furthermore
quite non-transparent to the user. In this work, we employ visual analytics to identify colluding digital
identities. The ultimate benefit of our approach is the transparent revelation of the true reputation of an
entity by interactively using both endogenous and exogenous discounting methods. We thereto introduce a
generic conceptual design of a visual analytics component that is independent of the underlying reputation
system. We then describe how this concept was implemented in a software prototype. Subsequently, we
demonstrate its proper functioning by means of an empirical study based on two real-world datasets
from eBay and Epinions. Overall, we show that our approach notably enhances transparency, bares an
enormous potential and might thus lead to substantially more robust reputation systems and enhanced
user experience.
Keywords: Trust, reputation system, unfair ratings, collusion, visual analytics.
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1 Introduction
Modern e-commerce platforms such as electronic marketplaces provide a valuable environment that
brings together millions of actors to trade goods and services. Buyers and sellers are thereby offered
unprecedented opportunities involving an almost infinite variety of products. Regardless of whether a
buyer is looking for antiquarian books, brand-new technologies or highly specialized instruments, he will
find a suitable transaction partner on the Web in most of the times. However, this “universe of strangers”
also poses many challenges (Dellarocas, 2006). Unlike in traditional face-to-face transactions, buyers do
neither get a complete picture of the products’ actual quality nor do they know about the trustworthiness
of a seller. Since advance payment is a usual practice in multiple settings, buyers often face high risks. To
cope with this challenge, many e-commerce systems encourage customers to provide feedback after a
transaction denoting their satisfaction. Reputation systems collect all evidence, aggregate the input data
and provide one or several reputation values as output. In this way, reputation systems can support buyers
in deciding whom to trust and what product or service to choose.
According to a recent study carried out by Diekmann et al. (2014), sellers with better reputation obtain
higher prices and have an increased number of sales. While on the one hand promoting trustworthy parti-
cipation, this also bares an incentive for malicious actors to unfairly push their reputation in order to gain
more profit. Unfair ratings have already become a serious problem in practice. Favorably recommending
each other to dishonestly increase the reputation on eBay1 or slandering on review sites to unfairly destroy
the reputation of a competitor such as on TripAdvisor2 are only a few of multiple examples (Jøsang and
Ismail, 2002; TripeAdvisor, 2012).
The problem of unfair ratings has therefore been a topical issue in research for many years. Solutions
introduced to deal with this problem span statistical filtering, clustering-based discounting and evaluation
techniques using hidden markov chains (Sänger and Pernul, 2014a). These approaches, however, are highly
non-transparent to end users since a numerical value as outcome cannot convey any detailed information
about the input data and the calculation techniques used. To address this challenge, we make use of visual
analytics. Visual analytics is based on the principle to incorporate the cognitive capabilities of a human
analyst and the computing power of a machine. By means of a software tool3 we implemented, we will
demonstrate that using interactive visualizations, collusive unfair rating attacks on reputation systems can
be reliably and transparently detected and filtered. We will furthermore show that our approach allows to
combine endogenous and exogenous detecting mechanisms to mitigate their respective weaknesses.
The remainder of this paper is organized according to the guidelines for conducting design science research
proposed by Hevner et al. (2004). We thereby follow the “nominal process model” introduced by Peffers
et al. (2007). Firstly, we describe the background and related work that is important with respect to our
approach in Section 2. Here, we motivate our work, delineate the research gap we discovered and define
the objectives of our solution (“Problem identification and motivation” and “Objectives of a solution”).
Secondly, we propose our interactive visualization-based approach in Section 3. We thereby describe the
conceptual design as a generic mechanism that can be adapted to a specific application area. Then, we
show how the concept was implemented in a prototype (“Design and development”). Subsequently, we
demonstrate the proper functioning of our prototype using real-world datasets from eBay and Epinions4
in Section 4. Here, we carry out two case studies in which we show how to reliably identity unfair rating
attacks using our prototype and evaluate the outcomes (“Demonstration” and “Evaluation”). Finally, we
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2 Background
In this section, we give an overview of the research areas that are relevant with respect to our work. Firstly,
we introduce the fundamental concepts of online trust and reputation systems. Secondly, we outline related
work regarding unfair rating attacks and defense mechanisms. We thereby point out the weaknesses of
common solution approaches and motivate our work. At the same time, the concept of visual analytics
will be introduced. Based on this, we clarify the research gap and define the solution objectives.
2.1 Online Trust and Reputation Systems
The notion of trust has been discussed in research for decades. It is not only important for the computer
science community but also for various other research domains such as sociology, psychology, economics,
philosophy, and media science. Consequently, there are just as many interpretations of it and a universally
accepted definition is still missing. As our work particularly focuses on online trust, we refer to Gambetta’s
(1988) definition of reliability trust that is commonly cited in the literature on online trust and reputation.
In short, the definition regards trust as the subjective probability with which the entity under observation
assesses that another entity will perform a particular action. One way to come up with this probability is
through reputation-based (as opposed to policy-based) trust establishment (Artz and Gil, 2007). Reputation-
based trust is derived from past interaction experiences and behavior associated with an entity, which
includes both one’s own perceptions and recommendations by others (Habib et al., 2013).
Since the number of entities involved in an online environment may be of the order of millions, manually
determining their reputation becomes unmanageable. To address this, reputation systems have emerged
in the recent decades. Reputation systems encourage actors of a community to leave feedback about
the behavior of an entity. They then collect all evidence available, aggregate the data and provide one
or several reputation values as output. The application areas span multiple fields such as e-commerce
(Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002), P2P networks (Gupta et al., 2003), and virtual organizations (Winkler
et al., 2007), just to name a few. In electronic marketplaces, for instance, buyers are able to rate sellers
after each transaction. Based on these experiences, future customers can decide whether to trust a seller
and as a consequence whether to buy. Hence, high reputation is not only an evidence for trustworthiness
but also leads to an increased number of sales and higher prices, as pointed out by Diekmann et al. (2014).
This bares an incentive for actors to unfairly push their reputation.
2.2 Unfair Rating Attacks
Because of their economic importance, reputation systems have been subject to various kinds of attacks.
So far, most research activities have focused on seller attacks, meaning what an adversary is able to do in
the role of the seller. Typical examples for seller attacks include playbooks, value imbalance exploitation,
re-entry, discrimination, and reputation lag exploitation, to name the most important. Advisor attacks,
in contrast, have received less attention. According to Jøsang and Golbeck (2009), advisor attacks can
be summarized under the term “unfair rating attacks” because they are based on one or several digital
identities providing unfair ratings to other digital identities. In this work, we distinguish different kinds
of advisor attacks according to two dimensions. Firstly, ratings can either be unfairly high or unfairly
low. These two types of attacks are also referred to as “ballot stuffing” and “badmouthing”, respectively
(Dellarocas, 2000). Secondly, advisor attacks can be carried out either by one single digital identity
(“one-man show”), by several digital identities focusing on one target (“Sybil attack”), or by several
digital identities positively influencing one another (“collusion attack”). Note that the term “Sybil attack”
normally refers to one entity creating and maliciously using multiple digital identities. Since we cannot
distinguish multiple entities from multiple identities, we use the term in a different way in this work.
Regarding the two attack dimensions, it has to be pointed out that not all possible combinations are equally
relevant in real-world scenarios. Figure 1 provides an overview on this.
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Figure 1. Dimensions of unfair rating attacks and their importance in real-world scenarios.
On the one hand, badmouthing is generally harder to perform than ballot stuffing as most reputation sys-
tems used in e-commerce only allow to provide feedback after a successful transaction. Since transactions
are bound to costs, there usually is an investment barrier. To push the reputation of a colluding digital
identity through unfairly high ratings, in contrast, fake transactions can be used and require a considerably
lower investment. Moreover, unfairly low ratings can easily be reported by the actor harmed whereas in
ballot stuffing attacks, there is nobody to claim against. On the other hand, attacks performed by multiple
digital identities are more important than attacks implemented by single individuals. In the one-man show
scenario, badmouthing will quickly lead to other sellers reporting the attacking digital identity. Ballot
stuffing, again, does not really make sense because there is no reason for pushing the reputation of a
non-colluding seller. If at all, one-man show attacks can only serve as an attack against the system as a
whole (e.g. always providing totally random ratings). Taking this into consideration, we mainly focus on
unfairly high ratings that are provided through Sybil or collusion attacks.
2.3 Detection of Unfair Rating Attacks
As the problem of unfair ratings was one of the first weaknesses of reputation systems discussed in
literature, a few defense mechanisms have been proposed in the recent years. According to Whitby et
al. (2004), the body of related work on the detection of unfair rating attacks can broadly be divided into
two groups: endogenous discounting and exogenous discounting. Endogenous discounting methods try
to detect unfair ratings on the basis of their statistical properties. An early probabilistic approach in this
domain was suggested by Dellarocas (2000), who used cluster filtering methods to separate unfair ratings
from fair ratings. Whitby et al. (2004) furthermore developed a statistical method based on the beta
reputation system introduced by Jøsang and Ismail (2002). They noted that their filter was less effective if
more than 30% of the users of the platform were unfair raters, and even counterproductive if the share
exceeded 40%. The presence of too many unfair ratings is one of the common problems of majority
rule-based approaches. Other early probabilistic approaches were compared by Zhang et al. (2008). A
related class of approaches that has come into focus more recently is based on signal modeling (e.g. (Sun
and Liu, 2012; Yang et al., 2009)).
Exogenous discounting methods, as the second group of defense mechanisms, are not based on ratings
and their statistical properties but focus on the reputation of the raters instead. The underlying assumption
is that raters with a bad reputation are more likely to provide dishonest ratings. Cornelli et al. (2002)
introduced a reputation scheme on top of the Gnutella P2P network. Users could request opinions about the
foreign entities offering a particular file from their peers and, based upon them, decide from which entity
to download. Yu and Singh (2003) examined trust networks, especially in e-commerce, and proposed a
variant of the weighted majority algorithm (Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994). In their approach, advisors
were assigned with weights which could be decreased after unsuccessful predictions. A related strategy
often employed in literature is to use ratings provided by a priori trusted agents as a benchmark (Jøsang
and Golbeck, 2009). However, these trusted agents have to be determined first. Moreover, the strategy is
not feasible under certain circumstances such as in the case of a discriminating seller.
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Overall, we found that all known defense mechanisms apply a purely mathematical approach that leads
to one or several numerical reputation values as output. These computation methods, however, are non-
transparent and incomprehensible for the end user (Hammer et al., 2013). A number as the only output
does indeed not reveal many details about the content of the input data. As a consequence, many users
become skeptical. For this reason, we pursue a different path by providing an interactive visualization for
reputation assessment. By involving the user in the evaluation process, we even enable to interactively
switch between endogenous and exogenous techniques to detect unfair ratings.
2.4 Visual Analytics
Visualization is one of the key factors in this proposal. Therefore, we adopt some ideas from visual
analytics, which is an interdisciplinary and fast-growing research field combining automated analysis
techniques with interactive visualizations. Transferred to our problem scenario, we can employ the
computing power of machines to perform clustering operations and the visual-cognitive capabilities of
humans to analyze the outcomes of the computations visualized in a meaningful way. We use the visual
analytics process introduced by Keim et al. (2010) as the basis for developing our detection methodology
(see Section 3.1) as well as the corresponding prototype (see Section 3.2).
Visual analytics has so far not played a role in reputation systems except one previous work addressing
the visual detection of seller attacks (Sänger and Pernul, 2014b). Further approaches that tried to include
visualizations only made use of static charts or graphs such as the trust network depicted by O’Donovan
et al. (2007). Another proposal closely related to this work was presented by Wang and Lu (2006).
Although their application scenario was the detection of Sybil attacks in wireless networks and thus
different from ours, they had similar goals and ideas. They wanted to design a user-friendly visualization
to reveal meaningful correlations and ultimately identify the Sybil attack. Moreover, they argued that the
information on the network topology have to be arranged appropriately in order to demonstrate significant
features of intrusions. In contrast to our approach, Wang and Lu (2006) assumed that the links among
the nodes in the network are bidirectional and thus not directed. They furthermore do not allow multiple
edges and edge weights, which makes our visualization technique strongly different.
2.5 Research Gap and Objectives
As pointed out before, most metrics and defense mechanisms to detect unfair ratings used in common
reputation systems are quite non-transparent since they only provide an aggregated reputation value that
does not reveal any details of how it was determined. In a user-centric study carried out by Hammer et
al. (2013), more than half of the participants criticized this lack of transparency. Enhanced transparency
could therefore notably increase the user experience in reputation systems. Visualizations are perfectly
suitable for depicting a load of data in one picture. Furthermore, they enable to easily and transparently
detect structures and anomalies. In this work, we are taking a first step toward detecting unfair ratings by
means of interactive visualizations and particularly focus on collusion and Sybil attacks.
In our approach, we want to combine the two broad classes of unfair rating detection methods introduced
before. Depending on the attack scenario, either endogenous or exogenous ones can be the more promising
choice. Thus, we offer an endogenous discounting component in the form of a clustering algorithm that
takes into account the feedback received by digital identities related to the identity in focus. The exogenous
discounting component is realized by implementing a sorter that operates on the reputation values of the
advisors of the identity in focus. We then let the end user select the appropriate detection techniques.
In a nutshell, our overall goal is to use visual analytics concepts to identify colluding digital identities and
enable the end user to filter their unfairly high ratings. The ultimate benefit is the transparent revelation of
the true reputation of a particular seller by interactively using both endogenous and exogenous filtering
methods.
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3 Detecting and Filtering Unfair Ratings through Interactive
Visualizations
In this section, we present our novel visualization-based approach to interactively identify and filter unfair
ratings in online trust and reputation systems with focus on e-commerce. Firstly, we expose the conceptual
design of our visual analytics methodology, which is independent of the reputation model in use. Thus,
this concept serves as a generic mechanism that can be adapted to a specific application area. Secondly,
we show how the conceptual design was implemented in a software prototype.
3.1 Conceptual Design
Adapting the visual analytics process, the conceptual design of a visual analytics software can be described
within the two essential building blocks “models” and “visualization & interaction techniques”. The
selection of appropriate models and visualization & interaction techniques, however, cannot be made ex
ante but depends on the structure of the raw data that serve as input. Therefore, before describing the
models, an analysis of the input data needs to be carried out in a preliminary step.
3.1.1 Preliminary Analysis
A typical e-commerce setting involves three groups of entities, namely buyers, sellers and products. In
electronic marketplaces, actors can be both buyers and sellers. Concerning the trust relationships between
those entities, we typically have two roles: the trusting entity (trustor) and the trusted entity (trustee). The
buyer usually takes the role of the trustor who wants to establish a trust relationship toward a seller or, if
the seller is trusted, toward the quality of a product or service. To support buyers in building such trust
relations, other buyers are encouraged to leave feedback denoting their satisfaction. This feedback mostly
consists of a numerical rating value and a textual review. Feedback is therefore created as a directed
opinion from a buyer toward a seller/product. As this feedback can be either honest or dishonest, many
systems furthermore allow to rate the quality of feedback, and thus, the trustworthiness of a buyer as a
recommender. In this way, the most reliable feedback/recommender can be determined.
Obviously, there is a difference between feedback given to sellers/products (subsequently referred to
as seller feedback) and feedback given to buyers/reviews (subsequently referred to as recommender
feedback). Seller feedback might help other actors to decide whether a seller is trustworthy or whether a
product is of high quality. Recommender feedback, in contrast, gives a lead whether a recommender is
trustworthy in the sense of how reliable and honest his feedback is. Therefore, we distinguish between
two types of feedback, seller and recommender feedback. Referrals of each type form a feedback network,
the seller feedback network and the recommender feedback network.
3.1.2 Building Block: Models
To model this setting, the feedback networks are represented by two graphs. Throughout this paper, we
use the two terms network and graph interchangeably. The seller feedback graph Gs contains all feedback
given by buyers toward sellers or products while the recommender feedback graph Gr contains all feedback
given toward recommenders. As a pair of nodes can be involved in more than one transaction and as all
edges are associated with a numerical rating value, the feedback graphs are defined as weighted directed
multigraphs: Gs,r = (V,E,R, f ,w) where V is a set of vertices representing the entities and E is a set of
edges representing the feedback relations. R is the rating set that is formed by all rating values allowed by
the reputation system. Furthermore, we have a function f : E→V ×V = {(u,v)|u,v ∈V} describing the
direction of a feedback relation and a function w : E→ R denoting the rating values associated with each
edge.
Figure 2 depicts an example scenario for an electronic marketplace (R = {−1,0,1}). Here, five parties are
involved: A who acts as a seller only, B who takes the role of both buyer and seller, and C who is a buyer
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only. We furthermore have two nodes D and E who negatively rated the recommendation made by B and
positively rated all recommendations made by C.
Figure 2. Feedback graphs after three transactions between actors A,B and C.
To analyze the role and position of single nodes in these networks, we set up a list of common graph
measures/operations shown in Table 1.
Measure/Operation Description
VertexInDegree(G,x) The number of incoming edges of a vertex x in a network G. The
VertexInDegree is equivalent to the number of feedback received. Example
(for the scenario above): VertexInDegree(Gs,B) = 2
VertexInDegree(G,x,y) The number of edges from vertex y to vertex x in a network G. Example:
VertexInDegree(Gr,A,B) = 0
AverageVertexInWeight(G,x) The average of the weights of all incoming edges of vertex x in the network
G. AverageVertexInWeight is equivalent to the simple average as a reputation
measure. Example: AverageVertexInWeight(Gr,B) =−1
AverageVertexInWeight(G,x,y) The average of the weights of all incoming of edges from vertex y to vertex x in
a network G. Example: AverageVertexInWeight(Gr,B,D) =−1
Clustering Through clustering, communities (set of nodes that is densely connected inter-
nally) within the graph can be detected.
Table 1. Graph measures and operations applied to analyze the feedback graphs.
In order to carry out the mapping of this model to a 2-dimensional visualization space, a convenient
visualization technique needs to be selected in the subsequent step.
3.1.3 Building Block: Visualization & Interaction Techniques
3.1.3.1 The Reputation Matrix
There is wide range of visualization techniques suitable for network data. Common techniques for
displaying graphs can be divided into three groups: node-link, matrix-based and hybrid representation
(Landesberger et al., 2011). According to a comparison of node-link and matrix-based representation
carried out by Ghoniem et al. (2004), node-link diagrams are particularly suitable for small graphs.
Matrices, however, are more convenient for large or dense networks. Using appropriate node ordering,
matrices can furthermore easily reveal substructures such as communities in a graph. Common e-commerce
environments can involve both a high number of nodes and a large amount of transactions. As we want
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to detect collusive behavior by applying different reputation measures, we decided to choose a matrix
representation combined with node ordering.
Figure 3. Reputation matrix of the buyer feedback graph for an electronic marketplace with 7 actors
and positive, neutral and negative ratings.
In general, a matrix representation visualizes the adjacency matrix of the given graph and displays the
edges in the cells. As our graph is not a simple graph but a multigraph with weighted edges, we make use of
two further visual levers, namely color and opacity. Analogous to a heat map, where the values contained in
a matrix field are represented as colors, we range the colors according to the AverageVertexInWeight(a,b).
In this way, we can clearly depict the aggregated ratings from vertex b towards vertex a. To additionally
include the strength of a tie (relation) between two nodes, we vary the opacity of a matrix field according
to the VertexInDegree(a,b). The result is the reputation matrix as depicted in Figure 3.
Figure 4. Reduced weighted heat maps for actors “Peter” and “James”. All direct ratings toward the
actor in focus are listed in the first column.
On most electronic marketplaces, users are not presented an integrated view of the whole feedback
network. Instead, they rather focus on the evaluation of a specific seller’s feedback profile. Thus, it is not
necessary to display the entire feedback data of all actors. Consequently, we reduce the complete matrix
to all data relevant for the analysis of the vertex in focus. This again leads to a comparably dense network,
where a matrix representation is particularly advantageous. This operation is especially important for large
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electronic marketplaces with several thousands up to millions of actors. Visualizing the entire network
in a matrix would be impossible because of the limited space of common displays. Figure 4 shows two
reduced reputation matrices for the actors “Peter” and “James”.
3.1.3.2 Interaction Technique: Order and Filter
A randomly sorted matrix representation such as depicted above does only rarely allow to gain additional
insights a metric cannot convey. To identify attacks or anomalies in the feedback data, our matrix needs to
be resorted. Vertex ordering, however, is one of the biggest challenges of using a matrix representation
(Mueller et al., 2007). An effective way to cope with this limitation is user interaction. Making use of
the user’s experience and his visual cognitive capabilities, the incorporation of a human analyst and a
computer might have an advantage over analyses carried out by machines only. We therefore propose
an interaction technique we call “order and filter”. Here, the user first applies an ordering mechanism to
bring the rows and columns in an order that might allow to reveal correlation and find groups of unfair
ratings. Subsequently, he can use a selection tool to select and filter the unfair ratings identified.
Ordering based on Objective
AverageVertexInWeight(Gr,x),
VertexInDegree(Gr,x)
Detection of random unfair ratings. The AverageVertexInWeight and the
VertexInDegree of the seller graph can be considered to be measures for the
recommender reputation. Detecting and discounting false feedback based on
recommender reputation has been shown to be an effective mechanism against
unfair ratings in several publications (Tavakolifard and Almeroth, 2012). Order-
ing all actors by recommender reputation in a decreasing manor, unfair ratings
would accumulate on the bottom left of the matrix.
VertexInDegree(Gs,x = a,y) Collusion & Sybil attack detection. According to Li et al. (2012), collusion
is characterized through (among other things) high reputation of all colluding
nodes and a high rating frequency attributed to very positive ratings between all
colluding parties. Ordering based on the number of feedback relations between
node a (the actor in focus) and all other related nodes helps us to identify and
filter suspicious actors that have provided multiple ratings to artificially increase
or decrease node a’s reputation. Depending on the ordering (i.e. ascending or
descending), we will find a square depicting the relations between the colluding
nodes on the top left of the matrix for collusion attacks. Sybil attacks, in contrast,
will form a bar.
Clusters Collusion & Sybil attack detection. There are many publications that propose
clustering approaches to identify collusion or Sybil attacks in various envi-
ronments. Clustering is particularly interesting for attacks in which ordering
by advisor reputation or number of relations fails. This could be the case if
the group of colluding nodes is large enough to gain enough reputation by
exchanging only single positive ratings between all nodes. However, applying
clustering algorithms to detect communities in the buyer/seller reputation graph
and ordering all vertices based on the outcomes of the cluster analysis, these
groups can be detected and filtered.
Table 2. Ordering rules to identify malicious behavior that unfairly pushes the reputation of vertex a.
To implement this interaction technique, we set up a range of ordering mechanisms that adapt well-known
approaches to discount feedback from the research on trust and reputation systems. Table 2 gives an
overview of the ordering rules and the intended objectives. This generic conceptual design can be applied
in various application areas. To demonstrate our visualization-based approach, we implement a prototype
that can easily be adapted to different rating scales.
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3.2 Prototype Implementation
Since most online reputation systems for e-commerce settings are displayed in a browser, we implemented
our prototype using a three-tier client-server architecture applying state-of-the-art Web standards. We
decided to employ those for an easier integration with an electronic market place in the future. On the data
layer, we made use of a hybrid concept combining Couchbase and MySQL as two common solutions for
NoSQL and SQL. They contain all data necessary to set up the reputation matrix. Raw data must thereto
at least comprise unique users as well as a list of feedback ( f eedback_ f rom, f eedback_to, rating_value).
The logic layer was implemented in PHP scripts employing an Apache webserver. The rating interval R
of the specific application area can be individually defined by the developer to fit the input data. As our
clustering algorithm we chose DBSCAN, which is a “Density-Based Algorithm for Discovering Clusters
in Large Spatial Databases with Noise” (Ester et al., 1996). As pointed out in Section 2, collusion is
characterized by a higher rating frequency as well as a higher density within the colluding nodes. Thus,
a density-based standard algorithm suffices our prototypical needs. The case studies introduced in the
following section will furthermore demonstrate its effectiveness. The presentation layer was implemented
using common Web standards such as HTML5, CSS3, SVG and JavaScript. The visualization in particular
was implemented by means of the d3.js-package5. D3 (Data-Driven Documents) is a JavaScript library en-
abling to manipulate documents based on data. When applying D3, data are bound to the browser’s DOM.
This allows the user to instantly interact and manipulate the visualization. Regarding the implementation
of the matrix representation, we referred to an example proposed by Michael Bostock (2012).
4 Empirical Study
In order to demonstrate the proper functioning of our prototype, we introduce two empirical studies
of prominent online reputation systems. We use them to show how unfair rating attacks can reliably
be identified using our interactive visualization-based approach. The first real-world dataset contains
feedback profiles from the electronic marketplace eBay. The second dataset comprises a large number of
reviews from the customer review site Epinions.
4.1 Case 1: Electronic Marketplace - eBay
eBay constitutes one of the world’s largest electronic marketplace, involving more than 150 million active
buyers (eBay, 2014). On eBay, actors can take the role of both buyer and seller. According to a study
published by the eBay research lab in 2011, 82.5% of the users only buy while 5.76% of the users only
sell (Shen and Sundaresan, 2011). Therefore, only 11.74% of all users take both roles. eBay’s reputation
system, which can be considered one of the first and most prominent online reputation systems, allows the
transaction parties to rate each other after having carried out a transaction. These ratings can take values
of the interval R = {−1,0,1} for negative, neutral and positive.
Defining our model, we need two graphs – the seller feedback graph Gs and the recommender feedback
graph Gr. On eBay, feedback (recommendations) cannot directly be rated. However, buyer reputation
(the sum of all ratings from sellers toward a particular buyer) might be a good measure for recommender
reputation since transactions cost money, effort and time. Thus, developing buyer reputation is quite
expensive. Resnick et al. (2006) point out that in their field experiment on eBay’s reputation system,
feedback of buyers who had themselves no feedback was not equally considered as feedback from
well-established buyers. Therefore, we take feedback created by sellers toward buyers as recommender
feedback and feedback created by buyers toward sellers as seller feedback.
5 http://www.d3js.org/
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To demonstrate how unfair ratings can be detected and filtered, we acquired feedback data of several
suspicious eBay users. These user profiles could be found through buyer complaints on eBay’s community
boards. As multiple buyers had complained that they had not received their already payed products, we
had reasonable certainty that the respective sellers had malicious intentions. Our example involves a
feedback profile of an eBay seller who counts 110 reviews in total created in the last 6 months. 99 of these
take a positive, 3 a neutral and only 9 a negative value. This leads to an average of 89% positive ratings in
the last 6 months. Figure 5 (left) depicts the reputation matrix for the seller graph of our user in focus. We
anonymized the real user names by a sequential number, whereby user 1 is our user in focus.
Figure 5. Reputation matrix for the eBay user. Left: Columns are randomly sorted. Right: All feedback
but the cluster on the upper left is filtered. (Note: Original screenshot was distorted)
As the reputation matrix is reduced to all users directly related to the user in focus, the first column is
completely colored. Obviously, there are nearly no further relations between the other actors. This is
presumably due to the fact that most users take the role of buyers. Interactions between actors, however,
can only occur if at least one of both parties takes the role of a seller. Furthermore, it is noticeable that
there are two users who seem to have rated our user in focus quite often. Reordering the matrix by clusters
and selecting the suspicious ratings, we find that more than half of all ratings have been created by two
users as depicted in Figure 5 (right). As they mutually rated each other extraordinarily high (compared to
the rest), we found collusive behavior. A live demo of this case can be found online6.
4.2 Case 2: Customer Review Site - Epinions
In our second case study, we turn to the customer review site Epinions, whose main purpose is to enable
people to provide feedback on products and services. As these reviews might vary in quality, Epinions
furthermore allows its users to rate their helpfulness (see Figure 6). In this way, the trustworthiness of a
review/reviewer can be determined. Note that every review can be rated by every user of the platform. As
opposed to providing feedback on eBay, there are no transaction costs associated with this process. In our
case, we denote the rating of reviews as recommender feedback. We visualize the recommender feedback
graph Gr to detect ratings unfairly increasing the reputation of a recommender.
Figure 6. Review process on Epinions.
6 http://trust.bayforsec.de/unfair_ratings/
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For our investigations, we use a large-scale Epinions dataset containing about 132,000 users, 1,560,144
reviews and 13,668,319 ratings (Massa and Avesani, 2006). Ratings on reviews on Epinions are expressed
in a five-step scale ranging from Not helpful to Most helpful, which is internally mapped to values in the
interval R = [1;5]. The rating distribution of our dataset is as follows: 1: 0.017%, 2: 2.323%, 3: 5.609%,
4: 15.100%, 5: 76.950% (Average: 4.67)7.
To come up with an illustrative case, we inspected the dataset with respect to three criteria. Firstly, we
focused on reviewers whose reviews had at least 100 ratings in total. To be at all able to see collusive
behavior, we particularly looked for reviewers for whom a large share of their ratings came from a
small number of distinct raters. As a third criterion, the ratings of these suspicious raters should differ
significantly from the average ratings. Going through this procedure, we arrived at several interesting
cases. Our example visualized in Figure 7 focuses on user 547301 who has written 23 reviews and received
136 ratings for them with an average rating of 4.64.
Figure 7. Reputation matrix for the Epinions user. The columns are randomly sorted. (Note: Original
screenshot was distorted)
Again, the first column is completely colored because we reduced the reputation matrix to all users directly
related to the user in focus. As opposed to Figure 5, we can now observe many interactions between these
users. This is presumably due to the fact that almost half of the reviews on Epinions are written by less
than 1% of the users (Meyffret et al., 2012). Taking into account that these frequent reviewers are likely to
be frequent raters as well, the chances are high that some of them are included in any reputation matrix.
Patil et al. (2013) even identified an overlap of around 25% between the top-1% reviewers and top-1%
raters. Reordering this matrix by clusters and analyzing the large cluster at the bottom, we can confirm
these findings (see Figure 8).
As a consequence, the small cluster on the upper left side could depict collusive behavior. Selecting the
bottom cluster (filtering the upper cluster), we found that 73% of the total ratings were created by the
upper cluster. All of them carry the maximum positive value. Filtering these ratings reveals a completely
different picture with an average rating of just 3.68. Considering an average of 4.67 of all ratings in
our dataset, user 547301 comes off comparably badly. Ordering the nodes by reputation (exogenous
discounting), we furthermore found that most of the users involved in the upper cluster had a worse
reputation than the rest. Here, we can distinguish between colluding nodes (539034, 551367), who could
also profit from the collusive behavior, and Sybil nodes (539033, 547300, 550658, 542242, 538984), who
could not gain any advantage for themselves. A live demo of this case has been made publicly available8.
7 As suggested by the publishers of the dataset, the special rating value 6 is treated as 5.
8 http://trust.bayforsec.de/unfair_ratings/
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Figure 8. Reputation matrix for the Epinions user. The cluster on the bottom right is selected and other
ratings are then filtered. (Note: Original screenshot was distorted)
Overall, these empirical studies demonstrate that an interactive visualization can notably increase the
transparency of a reputation system by depicting all input data in one picture. Using our prototype, we
are able to show that unfair ratings – particularly in the form of collusive behavior and Sybil attacks –
can reliably be detected and filtered. Through the incorporation of the human analyst and the interactive
switching between endogenous and exogenous discounting methods, we allow to make well-informed
and comprehensible decisions.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we made a step toward applying visual analytics to detect unfair ratings in online trust and
reputation systems. We first introduced a generic conceptual design of a visual analytics methodology that
can easily be adapted to various use cases. Subsequently, we demonstrated how this generic concept can
be implemented in a prototype for the example of an e-commerce scenario. The empirical study based
on real-world data from eBay and Epinions revealed a variety of benefits of our interactive approach.
However, there are some shortcomings that could be topic of our future work.
On the one hand, our reduced matrix might not reveal advanced attacks that go beyond the direct interaction
between the actor in focus and his colluding partners. This in turn might be tolerable since advanced
attacks require enormous financial investments in most cases. On the other hand, the ordering metrics
employed in our prototype such as the reputation measure are still quite simple. An improvement of these
in future work might also support the detection of more sophisticated attacks. Moreover, for converting our
prototype into a final product, introducing multi-assignment clustering algorithms could reveal multiple
collusive clusters. Another fruitful enhancement could involve additional interaction techniques that tap
the full mindset of the human analyst.
Throughout this work, we showed that interactive visualizations bare an enormous potential that could
lead to substantially more robust reputation systems and enhanced user experience. Integrating our
methodology into an e-commerce environment, organizations could be aided in increasing the overall
transparency of their reputation systems.
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